Coding-agent hardening source-first coverage ledger

Research started 2026-11-15; final cited-URL recheck 2026-11-16. Scope: four local agent runtimes and their adjacent managed/configuration, CLI, integration and data surfaces. No tenants declared — Tier 0+1 only. No credential source was used, no live agent/tenant was hardened, and no device settings or upstream installations were changed. This is a bounded public-source review and offline test run, not an assertion of unpublished or complete enterprise product coverage.

The repository create-hth-guide, create-code-pack, verify-hth and validate-hth-guide playbooks and shared source/Trust Center discovery instructions were read. Source collection preceded control selection. Unknown surfaces below are retained as gaps, not promoted to verified absence. No ai-reviewed, ai-validated or human maturity status is claimed.

Product identity and immutable release pins

Product Official project / distribution Reviewed release Exact tag commit
OpenCode anomalyco/opencode; @opencode/cli v2.3.0 a6b15d33daf6ab7d35569f6d711fdb630b9f04e7
Hermes Agent NousResearch/hermes-agent; NousResearch/hermes-agent v0.23.1 3b421578588243f920886e6fe79a6faa87ea026e
Pi.dev earendil-works/pi; @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent v1.5.2 b4afdddf44e059c67ccf5097e5317d913521b470
OhMyPi can1357/oh-my-pi; @oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent v18.20.2 7c49c11aa5bbaf3f418406583096168ad5b8c6dc

OpenCode requires care: the first /releases/latest response returned V1 v1.19.5, whereas the release list/current installation docs showed V2 v2.3.0. Both products use the opencode command. Release-list and tag-commit checks resolved that ambiguity. Current OpenCode policies require 2.2.3 for separate integration/MCP/skill/plugin actions and 2.2.6 for web search; the full pack nevertheless accepts only 2.3.0, not every version above those floors. Pi’s historic project-extension advisory floor 0.79.0 is likewise not its pack’s supported-version range. Hermes is the Nous personal agent, not a model or another Hermes package. OhMyPi is independently versioned and does not inherit Pi.dev flags or security guarantees.

Default-branch snapshots used for discovery were OpenCode 5d55571d8d0ea5def971f193dd2d3e7b61eec39d, Hermes 4162ecf11f611400fa6e5c42d2f360188ce50b39, Pi 22fc026b872b4a7df22ffa94e8fa00b873128054 and OhMyPi 61311abb5abad892ce4e62dbd78fe06791f20ae8. Critical policy/managed/CLI/settings references were additionally read from the selected release tags. Public schemas are separately dated snapshots; current schema shape is not release-runtime proof.

Discovery boundaries and Trust Centers

Tier 2 searches covered the four product names plus CIS Benchmark, DISA STIG, CISA SCuBA, NSA and ACSC, restricted to their official domains where supported. No product-specific CIS/SCuBA baseline was identified in this search; DISA catalog coverage was not independently established and remains unverified, not “no STIG exists.” Generic OS/container benchmarks do not originate invented agent settings. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 supplies suggested relationships only, not product certification or exact vendor requirements.

Tier 3/4 sweeps included the SOURCES.md standing teams Pluto, PromptArmor, Trail of Bits and Legit Security plus upstream security advisories. Pluto’s TeamPCP agent-configuration persistence research was a discovery/rationale lead, not transcribed into an unverified detection or incident count. The first-party Pi advisory GHSA-mqxh-6gq7-558m was body-read and its affected/fixed versions used in Pi 1.1. Automated OhMyPi issue allegations and community comparisons were excluded as authoritative configuration evidence. No new third-party source is needed to originate the shipped controls.

Source-derived candidates and dispositions

The rows record settings and boundaries identified while reading the official documents, including limitations and deliberately unimplemented candidates. Pack availability is a separate census below.

Candidate / precise first-party source Conditions, defaults and limitations Disposition
OpenCode V1 migration and permissions V2 arrays, shell/subagent names; V1 and V2 share paths; plugin/API contracts differ Covered 1.1, 4.1; explicit version gate; no V1 config pack
OpenCode config locations System directories; macOS managed preference override; settings cannot prevent new resources Covered 1.2, 5.1; managed policies plus effective-source negative test
OpenCode policy matching/precedence Last match; default allow if no match; invalid statements dropped with warning; broader authority later Covered 1.2, 3.1–3.2, 5.1; ordered defaults and startup diagnostics required
OpenCode policy provider/integration actions Separate provider ID, integration connection and account scope; personal #account versus bare provider; Console scope Covered 3.1; exact direct-provider exception only; organization ID deliberately not fabricated
OpenCode policy MCP/skill/plugin/websearch actions Separate classes since 2.2.3; search floor 2.2.6; package/path identity differs Covered 3.2, 4.2; all four explicit denies; no inference that integration.use alone restricts them
OpenCode plugins / MCP Multiple discovery sources, additive plugin arrays and executable dependency code Covered 2.1, 3.2; top-level scan clearly not a complete inventory
OpenCode CLI web Loopback default, remote consent, one-use five-minute links, 30-day sessions, password invalidation Covered 2.2, 5.2; no remote exposure or session mutation performed
OpenCode network Managed service versus foreground environment, NO_PROXY loopback, CA verification, private service env can disclose proxy secrets Covered 2.2, 4.2; environment check and external enforcement, no proxy-only containment claim
OpenCode snapshots/Console SSO/tenant settings Distinct data/admin planes; not fully researched or exercised in this local-runtime scope Gap/outside current implementation: no retention toggle, tenant admin endpoint or universal DLP claim
Hermes SECURITY.md §2 Single-tenant; only OS isolation contains hostile model; terminal backend omits Python/execute_code/MCP/plugins/hooks/skills Covered 2.1, 3.2; Docker terminal setting is explicitly narrower than full wrapping
Hermes managed scope Root-owned source, fixed bootstrap selector, leaf pinning; malformed file ignored; world-readable managed env Covered 1.2, 3.1, 5.1; no secret values or permission changes installed
Hermes security approval modes Manual only for dangerous-command detector; Docker can skip checks; headless denies; allowlist exceptions and restart memory; YOLO persists Covered 4.1; no “ask for every tool” assertion
Hermes security approval approvers / confirmation keys [] limits answers to requester/platform administrators; [‘*’] admits any admitted member; reload/destructive confirms Covered 4.1; explicit type/value tests
Hermes security skill env / credential files Skills expand explicit env/file forwarding; read-only mounted credentials remain readable Covered 3.1–3.2; empty arrays are not claimed sufficient
Hermes security gateway authorization Platform allowlists/pairing; global allow-all config/env bridges and multiple profiles Covered 2.2; no fake identity API; real roster/pairing remains operator-specific
Hermes API server / dashboard API key required on loopback; full tool reach; narrow CORS; separate public dashboard OAuth/OIDC Covered 2.2; no server enabled, no keys created; dashboard/operator auth still requires manual verification
Hermes work-machine guide write safe root covers write_file/patch only; state roots needed; checkpoints sensitive, rollback preview Covered 4.2; no write-root or proxy recipe promoted to full containment
Hermes remote config backends / package-managed deployment Deployment and secret synchronization have independent trust requirements Adjacent gap: do not claim these packs provision Nix, Vault, hosted policy or remote secret backends
Pi security trust sequence No per-tool sandbox; context files load despite decline; sessionDir lookup before trust Covered 2.1, 4.2; explicit resource flags, no-session and absolute session directory
Pi CLI resource/tool options Explicit extension/skill paths override discovery disables; tools list alone leaves MCP reachable; no-mcp affects built-in implementation Covered 3.2, 4.1; fixed launch interface with abbreviation disabled, no arbitrary agent args
Pi settings / configuration Agent-directory trust default; project overrides; resource lists combine; state selectors; model selection is not enforced routing Covered 1.2, 3.1, 5.1; no managed tenant policy invented
Pi containerization Whole-process versus tool-only Gondolin; exposed credentials/network remain accessible Covered 2.1, 2.2; external boundary remains operator-supplied
Pi packages Executable package resources and source/version review Covered 3.2; no package install executed
Pi CLI credential commands auth check structured result; –no-refresh available; credential-print switches expose secrets Covered 3.1, 5.2; fixed opt-in read omits credential-print switches
Pi session sharing / user GUI / SDK hosts Retention/sharing and embedding can create distinct surfaces Covered 4.2 for local evidence governance; Radius/Durable/GUI admin and embedded SDK enforcement unverified/out of current pack scope
OhMyPi settings precedence Global < project < overlays < env < runtime; arrays replace; live invalid layers can retain last good Covered 1.2, 5.1; no immutable org-policy claim
OhMyPi approval modes Default YOLO; explicit per-tool deny/prompt; eval alternate shell; restrictedFolders shell cwd; headless subagents YOLO Covered 4.1; explicit eval/task/computer denies and negative-test plan
OhMyPi approval cache / computer.control Optional persistent grants; restricted folders not path containment; separate foreground control grant Covered 2.2, 4.2, 5.2; no grants cleared on a real device
OhMyPi settings provider/source disabling enabledProviders is foreign discovery, not model allowlist; disabledProviders shared namespace; project replacement Covered 3.1; no finite model blocklist advertised as exclusive routing
OhMyPi MCP settings source / discovery Project config switch leaves native user MCP; foreign configuration and profile roots Covered 2.1, 3.2; user/home/source inspection remains necessary
OhMyPi secrets / telemetry registry Secret obfuscation default false; OTLP export default true and next-launch change Covered 4.2; independent source registry keys, not inferred from Pi
OhMyPi auth broker/gateway, collab/browser services and SDK embedding Separate authenticated services, credentials, host environment and runtime overrides Partially covered by 2.2/3.1 review; no auth-broker deployment, collab tenant policy or SDK enforcement pack claimed; full service-specific review remains a gap

Six-surface automation census

“Not identified” is bounded to the first-party indexes/source tree examined, not proof of universal absence. All shipped handles are available in the reviewed references; no deprecated handle is required. Runtime APIs/SDKs are not presumed to be managed security administration.

Product Terraform resource / data source REST / GraphQL First-party CLI read / write SDK Native configuration SIEM
OpenCode No vendor managed-policy provider identified; independent registry coverage unverified Local server API documented; no managed-file write/GraphQL contract verified for these controls --version, service status reads shipped; debug config/source review documented; service setters are writes and not executed Typed client/runtime SDK exists; no fleet policy API verified System/managed policy JSON and permissions are the shipped candidate surface Local diagnostics; no stable tenant audit-export contract verified; no fabricated SIEM events
Hermes No managed-scope provider identified; registry absence not asserted API server chat/run/session/tool interfaces read; not a fleet managed-file API; GraphQL not identified in those refs --version, doctor shipped; config/set, pairing, plugin and gateway writes documented but not executed Python plugin/agent APIs are executable extension surfaces, not verified fleet admin methods Managed YAML/JSON, approval/env/credential controls shipped as candidates Local diagnostics/session data; no complete normalized tenant audit schema verified
Pi No official provider identified; registry coverage unverified RPC/JSON integration interface, not a verified managed tenant REST/GraphQL policy plane --version, auth check --json --no-refresh shipped; package/auth writes exist and are not run Official createAgentSession/runtime SDK exists; caller owns enforcement; no admin SDK invented Agent settings JSON plus fixed CLI resource flags shipped JSON/session stream exists; no stable security-event export or tenant admin audit corpus asserted
OhMyPi No provider identified in official docs; registry coverage unverified RPC/ACP and optional broker/gateway interfaces exist; no managed organization policy REST/GraphQL schema verified --version, typed config get reads shipped; config set/reset writes documented, not run Runtime/plugin SDK exists with overrides; not an immutable management plane Typed YAML/JSON settings, final overlay and approval map shipped OTLP exporters and local evidence exist; no invented security-event schema or detection query

Each guide has 10 controls with a pack and two shipped types (config, cli). Config candidates and CLI verification cover their real interfaces; a third nominal type is not fabricated to improve a diversity count. Read/audit code is distinct from candidate emitters. No candidate is installed; no native setter is invoked. The CLI inventory has four new rows with the precise local/runtime versus tenant-admin distinction.

Retrieval evidence and failures

Public docs were read through web extraction and first-party raw GitHub snapshots. Final cited URLs were re-fetched with a browser user agent and content-specific title/body identity on 2026-11-16; these are DRIFT-CHECKED-ONLY, never live-validation passes. SHA-256 records of downloaded public sources were kept in temporary research artifacts. Native schema snapshots and their hashes are committed with the fixtures for offline reproducibility.

Initial fetches of an assumed OpenCode cli/paths.mdx, Hermes messaging.md/hermes-docker.md and OhMyPi docs/cli.md returned 404. They were not treated as missing capabilities: the documentation trees were inspected, supported references selected, and no failed path is cited by a guide. The default fetcher got 403 from opencode.ai/config.json and models.dev/model-schema.json; a browser-user-agent retry returned the actual schema body, cached for tests. The latter is an explicit dependency of the former and is resolved offline during tests. Direct ordinary network access in the workspace was unavailable; approved public reads were used without executing fetched code.

URL Retrieval result / content identity  
https://docs.pi.dev/latest/cli 200; Command Line · Documentation · Pi; 127680 bytes  
https://docs.pi.dev/latest/configuration 200; Configuration · Documentation · Pi; 49554 bytes  
https://docs.pi.dev/latest/containerization 200; Run Pi in an isolated environment · Documentation · Pi; 110090 bytes  
https://docs.pi.dev/latest/packages 200; Pi Packages · Documentation · Pi; 78013 bytes  
https://docs.pi.dev/latest/security 200; Run Pi safely · Documentation · Pi; 64435 bytes  
https://docs.pi.dev/latest/settings 200; Settings Reference · Documentation · Pi; 88333 bytes  
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/v0.23.1/SECURITY.md 200; hermes-agent/SECURITY.md at v0.23.1 · NousResearch/hermes-agent · GitHub; 276207 bytes  
https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/v18.20.2/README.md 200; oh-my-pi/README.md at v18.20.2 · can1357/oh-my-pi · GitHub; 570371 bytes  
https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/v18.20.2/docs/approval-mode.md 200; oh-my-pi/docs/approval-mode.md at v18.20.2 · can1357/oh-my-pi · GitHub; 314752 bytes  
https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/v18.20.2/docs/config-usage.md 200; oh-my-pi/docs/config-usage.md at v18.20.2 · can1357/oh-my-pi · GitHub; 387063 bytes  
https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/v18.20.2/docs/mcp-config.md 200; oh-my-pi/docs/mcp-config.md at v18.20.2 · can1357/oh-my-pi · GitHub; 443259 bytes  
https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/v18.20.2/docs/settings.md 200; oh-my-pi/docs/settings.md at v18.20.2 · can1357/oh-my-pi · GitHub; 1113907 bytes  
https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/v18.20.2/packages/coding-agent/src/secrets/settings.ts 200; oh-my-pi/packages/coding-agent/src/secrets/settings.ts at v18.20.2 · can1357/oh-my-pi · GitHub; 200011 bytes  
https://github.com/earendil-works/pi/security/advisories/GHSA-mqxh-6gq7-558m 200; Pi loads project-local extensions without approval · Advisory · earendil-works/pi · GitHub; 156706 bytes  
https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/guides/secure-hermes-on-a-work-machine 200; Running Hermes on a Personal or Work Machine Hermes Agent; 60756 bytes
https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/cli 200; CLI Interface Hermes Agent; 136748 bytes
https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/features/api-server 200; API Server Hermes Agent; 186154 bytes
https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/features/plugins 200; Plugins Hermes Agent; 269046 bytes
https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/managed-scope 200; Managed Scope Hermes Agent; 48675 bytes
https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/security 200; Security Hermes Agent; 197832 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/cli/commands/ 200; Commands OpenCode; 144249 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/cli/web/ 200; Web OpenCode; 54414 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/config/ 200; Config OpenCode; 154743 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/mcp-servers/ 200; MCP servers OpenCode; 144787 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/migrate-v1/ 200; Migrate from V1 OpenCode; 134040 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/network/ 200; Network OpenCode; 64687 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/permissions/ 200; Permissions OpenCode; 97159 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/plugins/ 200; Plugins OpenCode; 66787 bytes
https://opencode.ai/docs/policies/ 200; Policies OpenCode; 100913 bytes

Verification and evidence limits

Remaining evidence gaps are the inaccessible/partially enumerated Trust Center bodies, unverified product-specific DISA/provider/admin surfaces, adjacent hosted/broker/SDK administration, and all live enforcement results. These do not justify inventing configuration or upgrading maturity.