Slack OAuth token rotation: bounded reconciliation
Checked 2026-11-14 against main 5e9504e. This is a narrow addition, not a full Slack currency audit. Public first-party documents were fetched and their relevant bodies read through web retrieval. No tenant, app credential or live setting was accessed. Guide maturity remains ai-drafted.
Source-first findings
| Candidate/source | Observation | Disposition |
|---|---|---|
| Organization app policies | Enterprise token-rotation requirement applies prospectively to installs/updates; unused refresh tokens expire after 30 days | New 3.4, with existing-app reconciliation |
| Token rotation | 12-hour OAuth access tokens; test refresh before irreversible app enablement | 3.4 prerequisites; no post-breach rotation procedure |
| App lifecycle | Manifest rotation setting affects newly issued tokens | Validation must not equate manifest state with all tokens migrated |
| Manifest schema | OAuth and app-level token rotation are separate properties | OAuth config fragment only; app-level coverage remains follow-up |
| Manifest export | Configuration-token read for an authorized app, not arbitrary third-party inventory | Fail-closed 3.4 API read |
| CLI manifest | Remote and local sources differ | Explicit remote-source CLI read; no local posture assertion |
Automation census for this control
| Surface | Write/read evidence and decision |
|---|---|
| Terraform | No resource/data-source census completed for the org policy; unverified, no provider or resource invented |
| REST / GraphQL | Documented app-manifest export used for read. Org policy write/read and GraphQL contract unverified. App manifest writes exist but deployment is deliberately left to reviewed complete-manifest workflow, not an unsafe fragment replacement |
| First-party CLI | Inventory lists Slack CLI as app-development focused. Current command reference verifies remote manifest read. Included; not an organization admin-policy setter |
| SDK | Export reference lists official language wrappers of same app-manifest operation. No additional policy coverage established; API pack supplies the read without adding a dependency or duplicate SDK wrapper |
| Config | Native YAML settings.token_rotation_enabled fragment for owned apps; not standalone full manifest or organization policy |
| SIEM | Existing audit export coverage retained; no rotation-policy event schema verified, so no invented event/detection |
All used handles are present in current documentation without a deprecation label in the checked sections. Offline tests exercise failure paths and request boundaries, not Slack enforcement. Read packs cannot prove token expiry, app refresh correctness, or third-party coverage.
Trust Center boundary and adjacent baseline
Followed Slack Trust Center to Security and Compliance. Security redirected to localized Japanese content; no configuration claim depends on it. Compliance’s public resource list linked the Secure Configuration Guide for FedRAMP Moderate, whose five-page body was read (version 0.02, 2026-02-24). No paginated document catalog was exposed in the inspected public list; this is not a claim of complete Salesforce/Slack catalog coverage. HIPAA requirements and IRAP report requests were not submitted; restricted customer responsibility matrix remains unread.
The PDF applies to Enterprise/Enterprise+ FedRAMP Moderate, not GovSlack High or every commercial tenant. Its SSO/MFA, app approval, audit, session and EKM themes overlap existing guide sections. EMM/file-download restrictions, system-use banner, invitation/domain controls and unsupported-client monitoring are follow-up candidates requiring current product references and a broader pass. Do not transplant regulatory applicability. This addition resolves OAuth rotation only; those candidates remain explicit backlog.
Publication review additionally disabled local curl configuration, applied runtime profile gates, and wired the offline Slack/Snowflake tests into the existing CI workflow. Primary source bodies were independently fetched again before publication.