Snowflake: WIF boundaries and independent approval

Checked 2026-11-14 against main 5e9504e2901313138d86fdc610eb4d754bff7a92. This is a bounded update to WIF (§1.5) and a new MPA control (§1.6), not a complete Snowflake currency review. Existing v0.4.1 had WIF setup but no provider/account/issuer policy boundary and no MPA coverage. Ownership remains recorded as Snowflake; this pass makes no corporate reclassification.

Source-first candidates

Bodies below were fetched publicly through web retrieval in this run. The first three SQL references were additionally retrieved as vendor-published Markdown. No tenant was accessed and no policy was applied.

Candidate / source Plane and conditions Disposition
WIF hardening Authentication policy can narrow trust beyond individual workload binding Covered in 1.5; preserve binding and verify effective assignment
CREATE AUTHENTICATION POLICY WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_POLICY supports provider and account/issuer lists; unset lists are permissive within that dimension Available; DB 1.05 is a new unattached AWS-only example; CLI 1.05 describes a specified policy
CREATE MULTI PARTY APPROVAL POLICY Business Critical+; required self-protection operation; self approval defaults true Available; 1.6 explicitly chooses independent review; DB example does not attach/replace
MPA Console configuration/activation; operational impact on protected automation and approver lifecycle Covered in 1.6 rollout and recovery checks; no automatic activation/voting/replay
DESCRIBE MPA policy Read existing definition Available; CLI 1.06, not proof of activation
Agent identity and Restricted Session Scope Separate agent classification, masking and session ceilings Discovered and body-read; remains a substantive guide gap outside this bounded implementation, queued for dedicated review

Surface census

Write and read are separate files: native SQL examples create definitions; CLI scripts read them. This does not claim all documented transports have packs.

Surface Evidence/status Implementation or remaining gap
Terraform resources AND data sources Registry index/search identifies snowflake_authentication_policy and snowflake_authentication_policies; individual latest pages returned a JavaScript shell. Current indexed schema includes WIF fields. Repo pins the old Snowflake-Labs/snowflake ~> 0.90. Unverified exact compatibility; no new fields injected into that module. A separately tested provider migration and read/write packs remain work. MPA provider coverage unverified, not absent.
REST and GraphQL SQL API submits statements and reads results. Dedicated policy API/schema and GraphQL census incomplete. Native SQL is supplied; no bespoke credential/polling wrapper added. REST/GraphQL coverage remains a gap, not a no-API claim.
First-party CLI Inventory row 104 identifies snow; snow sql reference verifies query, connection, templating, format and exit flags. Available; two read-only inspectors, with strict identifier validation and propagated failures. SQL creation is a separate reviewed action, not bundled into inspectors.
SDK Python connector provides SQL transport. Dedicated policy objects not exhaustively reviewed. No duplicated SDK transport or compatibility claim; remains unimplemented.
Native config / DB Fetched SQL command references contain native WIF properties and MPA YAML inside SQL. Available; 1.05 and 1.06 DB templates, no profile-independent deployment loop.
SIEM MPA policy usage view and MPA workflow expose audit sources. No SIEM schema/event names invented. Export latency, grants and request fields require a separate validated detection pack.

There are multiple documented transports, so one native SQL example is not reported as exhaustive automation. CLI read-back is included now; provider/API/ SDK/detection coverage remains explicit. Existing SnowSQL and Terraform packs, including pre-existing broad mutation examples, were not validated in this pass.

Trust Center discovery boundary

Searches for Snowflake customer configuration/security guides surfaced the public resources catalog, the public technical-tools document and the product’s unrelated in-account Trust Center. The resources catalog returned no readable body in web retrieval, so category counts, pagination, adjacent government editions and private documents remain unverified. No access request, login, NDA acceptance or guessed download route was attempted. The technical-tools PDF was discovered but not read; no requirement is attributed to it. The in-account scanner docs are not a substitute for this vendor assurance catalog. This limitation prevents a comprehensive-baseline claim.

Verification